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CHILD SUPPORT, LIFE INSURANCE, AND THE
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT
Death discharges us of all our obligations.
Montaigne'
INTRODUCTION
In any divorce action when a child is involved, a major
concern is, or should be, the financial security of that child.
One method of achieving this security is for one or both parents
to name the child as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy.
The parties to a divorce may agree to maintain the child
as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy, and the property
settlement agreement may provide for such insurance and be
incorporated into the divorce decree. Such an agreement is
contractually binding and may be enforced by the court.2 But
divorcing spouses do not always agree, especially in a bitterly
contested divorce. The parent deprived of custody, so often the
father,3 may well resist settlement terms requiring the mainte-
nance of life insurance even though it is the child who might
suffer. In this latter context the court may be called upon to
order one or both parents to purchase or maintain life insur-
ance for the benefit of the child.' The ability of the Kentucky
courts to so provide for the security of the child is the focus of
this comment.
I. COMMON LAW FOUNDATIONS
Throughout the country the rule has been that the court
may not order a divorcing parent to maintain life insurance
I I ESSAYS OF MICHM DE MONTAIGNE, ch. VII at 27 (Charles Cotton, Translator,
W.C. Hazlitt ed. 1892).
2 Ky. REv. STAT. § 403.180(5) (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
See Comment, Paternal Custody of the Young Child Under the Kentucky No-
Fault Divorce Act, 66 Ky. L.J. 165 (1977). The Kentucky General Assembly has re-
cently eliminated the maternal presumption. 1978 Ky. Acts ch. 86 § 1 (amending KRS
§ 403.270). Presumably, paternal custody will be more common in the future, but it
remains to be seen whether the courts will discard the long-held prejudice against
paternal custody.
4 The court might also, on its own initiative, seek to secure the child's future
support by ordering life insurance.
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unless the legislature has provided otherwise by statute. 5 This
general rule rests upon two common law premises. First, a
father6 is obligated to support his child only during its minor-
ity.' Second, the parent is not obligated to settle an estate upon
his child because the obligation of support terminates at the
death of the parent regardless of the age of the child."
The Kentucky courts have adhered to these general
common-law principles. They have uniformly held that a fa-
ther has a responsibility to support his child only during its
minority? However, this common-law premise is not the pri-
5 24 AM. JuR.2d Divorce & Separation §§ 834, 837 (1966). See Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d
9, 15 (1974). A few jurisdictions, generally under statutory authority, find a life insur-
ance requirement permissible as security for the payment of child support. 24 Am.
JUR.2d, supra, at § 834. Kentucky has no such statute. The Kentucky provision for
security was directed against the husband who was "about to remove himself, or his
property" and was for the benefit of the wife. KRS § 403.080 (repealed 1972 Ky. Act.
ch. 182 § 29). While security may be an immediate, pre-death benefit, the real, sub-
stantial benefit is not received until the father dies. It is evident in Riley v. Riley, 131
So.2d 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) that the security rationale is really a guise to avoid
the rule that the support obligation ends at-death. See especially the lengthy dissent
in Riley by Judge Sturgis. Id. at 494-99. But guise or not, it is now the law in Florida
that a court may order the non-custodial parent to maintain life insurance with the
child as beneficiary so as to secure support payments. See, e.g., Bosem v. Bosem, 279
So.2d 863 (Fla. 1973) rev'g 269 So.2d 758 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Simon v. Simon,
319 So.2d 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (custodial parent may not be required to
maintain life insurance); Perkins v. Perkins, 310 So.2d 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975);
Becker v. King, 307 So.2d 855 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
' The general rule has been that the father bears the primary obligation of sup-
port. See, e.g., Bowman v. Bowman, 233 S.W.2d 1020 (Ky. 1950); Beutel v. Beutel,
189 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1945). But see, Brooks v. Burkeen, 549 S.W.2d 91 (Ky. 1977), and
text accompanying notes 63-70 infra for discussion of the movement towards a mutual
obligation of support.
Annot., supra note 5, § 2 at 15.
24 AM. JUR.2d, supra note 5, § 837; Annot., supra note 5, § 2 at 15.
See, e.g., Young v. Young, 413 S.W.2d 887 (Ky. 1967); Davis v. Davis, 347
S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1961); Whitaker v. Whitaker, 183 S.W.2d 623 (Ky. 1944); Central Ky.
Asylum for the Insane v. Knighton, 67 S.W. 366 (Ky. 1902); and Commonwealth v.
Wills' Ex'r, 13 Ky. Op. 963 (1886) (abstracted at 7 Ky. L. Rev. 677). But see Breuer v.
Dowden, 268 S.W. 541 (Ky. 1925) (obligation of support continues beyond minority if
child incapable of self-support (dictum)) and Crain v. Malone, 113 S.W. 67 (Ky. 1908)
(parent has obligation to care for dependent adult child).
While no Kentucky decision discusses the rationale underlying the rule, one might
draw the inference that they who bring a helpless child into the world owe to that child
a duty of support until the child is self-supporting. The implication is evident in such
assertions by the court that "a parent is not liable for support of an adult child unless
the child is incapable of self-support at the time of reaching his majority." Clark v.
Graves, 282 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Ky. 1955). However, the obligation of support does not
reattach if a child capable of self-support at majority subsequently becomes incapable
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mary obstacle to ordering the maintenance of life insurance. It
only prevents court-imposed insurance if a child is no longer a
minor. Insurance could be required, consistent with this
common-law principle, for the period of the child's minority or
until the child is otherwise emancipated. 0
The primary obstacle arises from the common-law princi-
ple that the death of the father terminates his legal obligation
of support." In Sandlin's Adm'x v. Allen, 2 the decedent's for-
mer spouse sought to hold his estate liable for periodic support
payments which would have become due had he lived. Their
daughter was still in high school. The Court held that Sandlin's
estate was not liable for three reasons. First, because the estate
of a non-divorced father has no obligation to support the dece-
dent's child, "it would be illogical to hold that, by reason of a
divorce decree, a child is in a better position in respect to his
father's estate than he would be without the decree for di-
vorce."'" Second, the Court relied on a New York decision" for
the proposition that the obligation to support a child is a per-
of support. Crain v. Mallone, 113 S.W. 67 (Ky. 1908). Also, in Sandlin's Adm'x v.
Allen, 90 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Ky. 1936), the Court, noted: "The liability of the decedent
for the support of his son is not founded on any contract, express or implied. It is simply
a natural and legal duty which is imposed on any father who brings a child into the
world." (quoting Rice v. Andrews, 217 N.Y.S. 528, 531 (Sup. Ct. 1926)).
The responsibility for support is not abrogated because the child does not reside
in the father's household. See, e.g., Clark v. Graves, 282 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1955);
Foreman v. Cook, 127 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1939). Neither is a father's obligation ended if
the child's custodian has deprived the father of visitation rights. Dalton v. Dalton, 367
S.W.2d 840 (Ky. 1963); Spencer v. Spencer, 312 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1958).
It should be noted that the requirement of paternal support does not always last
until the age of majority is reached. The Court, in Clark v. Graves, 282 S.W.2d 146,
148 (Ky. 1955), notes that "conditions may justify a court in relieving the father of such
responsibility before the child reaches majority." Petrilli notes that the obligation of
support ends: (1) when the child dies; (2) when the child, if a daughter, marries; (3)
when the child is emancipated; (4) when the child is inducted into the military; or (5)
when the child is adopted by another. R. Pgrmu, KENsTucKY FAMLY LAw § 27.5 (1969).
1' Decreasing term insurance could be limited to coincide with a child's minority
and thus would not violate this common-law principle. Alternatively, the court could
simply allow the insured parent to change the beneficiary of a whole life policy once
the child reaches majority.
"1 Petrilli notes that KRS § 403.250(3) (Supp. 1978) provides that death no longer
terminates the father's obligation of support. R. PgrmLu, supra note 9 (Supp. 1977).
This provision will be discussed infra.
2 90 S.W.2d 350 (Ky. 1936).
,' Id. at 353.
" Id. The decision relied on was Rice v. Andrews, 217 N.Y.S. 528 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
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sonal obligation and is not a. debt for which an estate is liable.
That personal obligation gives rise to a right to the services and
companionship of the child, a right that cannot be exercised
after death. The Court apparently agreed that because the
right to services and companionship had been lost through
death, the obligation of support should therefore be removed.'
5
Finally, the Court concluded that to hold the decedent's estate
liable for support payments would "upset the entire fabric of
statutory law regulating the distribution and devolution of es-
tates." 6
In Bowling v. Robinson, 7 the divorcing parents drew up an
agreement for the custody and support of the children. The
agreement was made part of the judgment, "subject to further
orders of the court." 8 When the father died, the mother sought
to enforce the agreement against the estate. Her theory, appar-
ently, was that the agreement with the father was a contract
and that the contractual obligations extended beyond the fa-
ther's death. She relied on Arnold v. Arnold's Ex'x,'5 in which
the father had specifically agreed to leave his estate to his
children. In Arnold, the Court had held the estate was bound
contractually by the agreement."0 However, the Bowling Court
found the facts before them to be more similar to those in
Sandlin and held that an order of support automatically termi-
nated at the father's death, "[u]nless there is a provision of
the judgment to the contrary. '21 The Court found that the
" The Rice opinion notes: "One of the considerations which made the father
responsible for the support and maintenance of the child vanished at the death of the
[father." 217 N.Y.S. at 531. But the Rice opinion does not rest on the loss of this
one right. The New York court was also reluctant to accord to the child of divorced
parents a benefit not enjoyed by the child of non-divorced parents: "[S]uch child has
no claim against his father's estate for his support and maintenance, but must shift
for himself. ... Id. at 530.
" 90 S.W.2d at 353 (quoting Carey v. Carey, 43 S.W.2d 489, 499 (Tenn. 1931)).
17 332 S.W.2d 285 (Ky. 1960).
Id. at 286.
" Id. at 287. The Arnold case is reported at 237 S.W.2d 58 (Ky. 1951).
237 S.W.2d at 62.
2, 332 S.W.2d at 287. The Court noted that it still had power to modify (in this
case abolish) a support decree after the father's death: "Unless there is a provision that
would unalterably impose liability upon the father's estate, the power of the court to
modify an allowance for support is not lost by the father's death." Id. This language
in Bowling and similar language in Sandlin may seem confusing. The Sandlin court
said: "Such power [to control the father's obligation] is not lost by the death of the
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"until the further orders of the court" language of the original
decree did not impose contractual liability on the father's es-
tate and could not extend the father's obligation beyond
death.2
2
II. REQUIRING LiFE INSURANCE
Kentucky's highest court first encountered the question of
court-imposed life insurance in Stephanski v. StephanskiM in
1971. After fourteen years of marriage and three children, the
wife sought an absolute divorce and custody of the children;
both were granted by the trial court. However, she was not
content with the amount of the award for child support and she
appealed. She also contended that the trial court erred in fail-
ing to order her ex-husband to name her and the children as
co-beneficiaries of a $15,000 life insurance policy. The court
father." 90 S.W.2d at 353. Does this mean that if a father dies while still under an
obligation to support a minor child that the court may intervene, continue the obliga-
tion, and thrust the obligation on the father's estate? Or does it simply mean the court
retains jurisdiction after the father's death so as to be able to decree the obligation at
an end and so modify the judgment? Petrilli suggests that the latter interpretation is
correct and that jurisdiction is retained only to declare the obligation at an end. R.
PmrmLu, supra note 9, at n.67(a).
But another question remains. May the trial court, in its initial judgment, without
the consent of the parties and before the father's death, provide that the father's estate
will be liable for support of the child in the event the father dies during the child's
minority? In Bowling the Court asserted:
Unless there is a provision of the judgment to the contrary, the death of
a parent who has been ordered to make payments for the support of his child
automatically terminates the obligation with respect to periodic payments
which would accrue after his death, and his estate is not bound for them.
Unless there is a provision that would unalterably impose liability upon the
father's estate, the power of the court to modify an allowance for support is
not lost by the father's death.
332 S.W.2d at 287. The "unless" clauses suggest that the trial court might include a
provision or impose liability in the initial judgment (without the consent of the parties)
which will bind the estate. Petrilli adds to the confusion: "The decree may clearly
intend to impose liability upon the father's estate, 'unalterably' (Bowling, p. 287)."
R. Prm Li, supra note 9, at n.67(b). The case of Budig v. Budig, 481 S.W.2d 95 (Ky.
1972) resolves the confusion: "We have held [citing Sandlin and Bowling] that a
parent is not liable for the support of a child after death unless he had obligated
himself for such support [citing Arnold]." Id. at 97 (emphasis added). Clearly, the
trial court could not impose a provision extending the obligation past death; such an
obligation could only be assumed voluntarily by the father in an agreement incorpo-
rated in the judgment as in Arnold v. Arnold's Ex'r, 237 S.W.2d 58 (Ky. 1951).
n 332 S.W.2d at 287.
- 473 S.W.2d 806 (1971).
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found that the support award left the wife and children in
difficult financial circumstances but that the husband could
not afford to pay more. The modest financial resources of the
husband and the fact that the trial court had declined to order
a provision for life insurance allowed the Court of Appeals to
avoid a decision of the life insurance question. After noting the
lack of unanimity among various jurisdictions as to the power
to impose a life insurance provision, the Court held: "It is not
necessary for us to determine which line of cases should be
followed. In our opinion, even if the chancellor had the power,
he did not abuse his discretion in failing to impose that obliga-
tion on Mr. Stephanski." 4 Had the father been more affluent
or had the trial court presumed to have the power to require
the maintenance of life insurance the Court would have had to
face the issue directly.
The latter instance arose in Budig v. Budig the following
year. The trial court ordered George Budig to "maintain in full
force and effect, with the children as beneficiaries, life insur-
ance in the sum of $60,000.00. ' '2 The Court of Appeals reversed
and explicitly held "that the chancellor erred in ordering
George to maintain life insurance for the benefit of his chil-
dren. 12 7 The Court did not offer a full exposition of the policy
underlying the decision. However, the Court found that those
jurisdictions which have ordered the maintenance of life insur-
ance have done so under statutes which require "a father to
provide for his children's support during their minority regard-
less of whether he [the father] remained alive. 2 8 Since at that
time there was no such statute in Kentucky, the Budig Court
reiterated the common-law rule that the obligation to support
one's child terminates at the parent's death unless the parent
contractually obligates his estate. This holding was explicitly
based on Sandlin, Bowling, and Arnold. If any questions re-
mained after those earlier opinions as to the inability of the
court to order the father or his estate to furnish support after
24 Id. at 808.
481 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1972).
2 Id. at 97.
v Id.
2S Id.
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death, they were dispelled by the clear, concise, and direct
holding of the Budig decision. 9
The Budig decision affords no details of the life insurance
plan ordered by the trial court, nor does it indicate if the father
was to maintain the policy with the children as beneficiaries
past their minority. Presumably, the decree of the trial court
might also have faltered on the common-law rule that the fa-
ther need not support his child beyond minority." But the
decision does not mention this rule and perhaps the decree of
the trial court did not violate it. In any event, given the fact
that a life insurance plan can be fashioned to coincide with the
minority of the child, the only clear obstacle to an order for the
maintenance of life insurance is the common-law principle that
the parent is not obligated for child support after the parent's
death. Life insurance, ipso facto, would not benefit the child
until after the parent died.
3 1
Ill. THE UNIFORM Acr
The Budig decision was handed down prior to Kentucky's
adoption of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.2 The Uni-
form Act abolishes the common-law rule, relied on in Budig,
that the death of the parent terminates the parent's obligation
of support. The section entitled "Modification and Termina-
tion of Provisions for Maintenance, Support and Property Dis-
position, ' '3 provides in subsection (c):
Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in
" See note 21 supra for a discussion of the ambiguous language in the Bowling
and Sandlin opinions. Specifically, the Budig Court held that "a parent is not liable
for the support of a child after death unless he obligated himself for such sup-
port. .. ."Id.
See notes 9-10 and accompanying text supra for discussion on this point.
2, However, see ,note 5 supra for a discussion of the use of insurance as security
for child support payments.
2' Act Relating to Marriage and Divorce, 1972 Ky. Acts ch. 182 (codified at KRS
§ 403 (Supp. 1976)). Compare NAT'L CoNF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT (amended 1971) [hereinafter cited and referred
to as the UNIFORM AcT] with KRS § 403 (Supp. 1978). See Note, Kentucky's New
Dissolution of Marriage Law, 61 Ky. L.J. 980 (1973) for such a comparison. For present
purposes, the changes made in the Uniform Act by the Kentucky legislature are of no
concern.
=' UNIFORM AcT § 316.
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the decree, provisions for the support of a child are termi-
nated by emancipation of the child but not by the death of a
parent obligated to support the child. When a parent obli-
gated to pay support dies, the amount of support may be
modified, revoked, or commuted to a lump sum payment to
the extent just and appropriate in the circumstances.Y
By its terms, the subsection terminates the support obligation
when the child is emancipated, but the death of the supporting
parent does not automatically terminate the obligation.3 The
parties or the court may provide for the contingency of the
premature death of the parent or parents in the original decree.
If no such provision is incorporated in the original decree, the
court may modify the support provisions at a later time, even
after the death *of one or both of the parents. In so doing, the
court must consider the factors enumerated in KRS § 403.210,
which states the criteria for a support order. The intent of the
Act is to encourage the divorcing parents to provide for the
support of a child during the full term of its minority, and, in
the absence of voluntary provisions, give to the court the dis-
cretion to impose post-death support provisions. 6
IV. LIFE INSURANCE AND THE UNIFORM Acr
The Uniform Act has statutorily removed the common-law
obstacle to the imposition of life insurance, the obstacle which
dictated the holding in Budig. While no Kentucky court has yet
so held, it is patently clear that the court may order a support-
ing parent to maintain life insurance for the benefit of the
child.
The course of court-decisions in Colorado is instructive. In
Laws v. Laws, 37 the Colorado Supreme Court held that the trial
court could not require the father to maintain life insurance in
the amount of $10,000 for each child until the children reached
majority. The Court found that the insurance required by the
trial court was not intended to enforce the orders of the court,
11 Kentucky adopted this subsection without alteration. Compare Umioimi Acr §
316(c) with KRS § 403.250(3) (Supp. 1978).
- UNIFORM ACT, Commissioner's Note to § 316(c); R. PvrluL, supa note 9, at §
27.5 (Supp. 1977).
M UNIFORM ACr, Commissioner's Note to § 316(c).
" 432 P.2d 632 (Colo. 1967).
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rather it was "simply a very bald order" to force the father to
settle an estate upon the children should he die before the
children reached majority. The Court also noted that no father
has a legal duty to carry insurance on his own life for the
benefit of his children and that "[ilt can hardly be contended
that the law places upon the divorced parent any greater obli-
gation toward his children than he has in the absence of di-
vorce. ' 39 While it is not stated quite as directly as in Ken-
tucky's Budig decision, it is clear that Colorado, like Kentucky,
proscribed the power of the trial court because of the common-
law rule that the father is relieved of child support obligations
by his own death," because a father has no obligation to settle
an estate on his child, and because a contrary decision would
give the child of divorced parents greater rights than the child
whose parents were not divorced.
In 1971, Colorado adopted the Uniform Act.4 Section
316(c) was adopted without legislative modification." Subse-
quently, in In re the Marriage of Ickel3 the Colorado Supreme
Court considered the sole question of whether the trial court
had the authority to order a parent, obligated to pay child
support, to maintain insurance on his life with his children as
named beneficiaries. The Court overruled the Laws decision,
holding that Colorado Revised Statute §14-10-122(3) abolishes
the old common-law rule and continues the support obligation
of a divorced parent beyond the parent's death. The Court
explicitly held: "The maintenance of a life insurance policy
provides a reasonable and practical means by which this obli-
gation can be met.""
V. OTHER QuEsTIoNs
Having concluded that the court may, in its discretion,
Id. at 635.
z, Id.
ja That the Laws opinion is based on the common-law rule is more explicitly noted
in In re the Marriage of Icke, 540 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Colo. 1975). See also McLeod v.
Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 1318 (Colo. 1974); and Menor v. Menor, 391
P.2d 473, 477 (Colo. 1964).
" 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 520.
4 Compare UmFoRm Acr § 316(c) with CoLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-122(3) (1973).
540 P.2d 1076 (Colo. 1975) aff'g 530 P.2d 1001 (Colo. App. 1974).
" Id. at 1077.
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require a divorcing parent to maintain life insurance for the
benefit of a child of the marriage, at least two questions follow:
Should the burden be imposed? And, who should bear the bur-
den if it is imposed?
As a rationale for the common-law rule which prohibited
the imposition of a post-death obligation of support, the courts
noted that (1) it interfered with the testamentary disposition
of the parent's estate, 5 (2) it seemed to require a parent to
settle an estate upon the child," (3) it benefited the child at a
point in time when the parent could no longer enjoy the recip-
rocal benefits of companionship and service," and (4) it gave
to the child of divorcing parents a benefit not enjoyed by a
child whose parents were not divorced." Might these objections
continue to deter the court from exercising its discretionary
power to order the maintenance of life insurance?
Continuing the support obligation beyond death may in-
deed interfere with the testamentary disposition of the parent's
estate. Conceivably, the executor may be required to make
monthly support payments for several years. 9 But such would
not be the case if life insurance were maintained to assure the
continued support. The life insurance proceeds would be paid
directly to the child or its custodian or would constitute a sepa-
rate fund apart from the testamentary estate. The executor
could quickly wind up matters without continuing concern
about the support obligation." Nor would a life insurance re-
quirement settle an estate upon the child in the sense that the
decedent parent would be forced to recognize the child in a will.
The requirement would no more determine the disposition of
" Sandlin's Adm'x v. Allen, 90 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Ky. 1936) (quoting Carey v.
Carey, 43 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tenn. 1931)).
, Rice v. Andrews, 217 N.Y.S. 528, 530 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
" Sandlin's Adm'x v. Allen, 90 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Ky. 1936) (quoting Rice v. An-
drews 217 N.Y.S. 528, 531 (Sup. Ct. 1926)).
" Bowling v. Robinson, 332 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Ky. 1960); Sandlin's Adm'x v. Allen,
90 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Ky. 1936).
" The comments to the Uniform Act suggest that "[t]o avoid indefinite delay in
the settlement of estates, there may be modification or commutation to a lump sum
payment 'to the extent just and appropriate in the circumstances.'" UNIOpm Acr,
Commissioners Note to § 316(c).
" The executor would, however, be well advised to inform the court of the insur-
ance provision for the support obligation and move that the court discharge the estate.
UNm Rm AcT, Commissioners Note to § 316(c).
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the decedent parent's property than would the traditional sup-
port order requiring monthly allotments prior to death. The life
insurance premium would increase those monthly allotments
paid during life but nothing more would be required of the
parent after death.
The third point, that a parent would confer a benefit with-
out reciprocity, seems a rather specious objection. The child
can hardly be blamed for the untimely demise of the parent.
With the obligations of support statutorily extended beyond
death, whatever logic this point may have had is now totally
lost.
There does seem, at first glance, to be an inconsistency in
conferring a benefit on the child of divorcing parents that can-
not be conferred on the child whose parents stay together. On
closer examination, however, it is not so inconsistent and what-
ever inconsistency that does exist seems justified. While non-
divorcing parents have no legal obligation to maintain life in-
surance, most families do have life insurance.5' If the child is
not the direct beneficiary, the chances are the child will benefit
indirectly because the surviving spouse is generally the direct
beneficiary. Also, even without life insurance, the children of
non-divorcing parents are probably protected upon their par-
ents' death by a will. If there is a will which inadequately
provides for the surviving spouse and children, the children are
protected indirectly to the extent the law allows a surviving
spouse to elect against the deceased spouse's will.5" The surviv-
ing spouse bears the legal obligation of child support5 and, to
some extent, the election statute ensures an adequate standard
of living. Although divorcing parents may provide for their chil-
dren in wills, the election statute is a benefit not afforded a
child of divorced parents. Furthermore, divorcing parents, by
the act of divorce, have subjected their arrangements for their
child to the scrutiny of the court. In assuming that responsibil-
ity, the court would be remiss in its duty 'f it did not provide
adequately for the present and future well-being of the child.
11 In 92% of all American families with children under age 18, at least one member
of the family owns life insurance. AmEmcCAN CouNcL O Lr INSURANCE, LinE INSURANCE
FACT BOOK '77, at 34 (1977).
2 See KRS § 392.080 (Supp. 1978) for Kentucky's election statute.
0 KRS § 403.210 (Supp. 1978).
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Perhaps financial security is an elusive goal,54 but if the court
does not make reasonable and thorough plans for financial se-
curity it would not be acting in the child's best interest.
5
There are other considerations" which favor the imposi-
tion of a life insurance requirement. The legislative extension
of the support obligation beyond death would be meaningless
to the child of a deceased parent with an insolvent estate. The
child is no less dependent after the parent's death and the
burden of support may fall in total or in part on society if the
surviving parent cannot fully carry the burden. Insurance, by
design, can secure that obligation of support and assure that
the obligation of the deceased parent will be met. Indeed, at
least one court has reasoned that the child of divorcing parents
may need even. greater financial security than the child of a
stable family and that insurance can be a reasonable means to
that security.
57
The primary objective of the support provisions of the Uni-
form Act is to accord the child the benefits it would have had
but for the divorce." Insurance on a parent's life is now a quite
common benefit enjoyed by the typical child.59 It is a common
means of securing not only the barest necessities," but also of
obtaining an advanced education or even of maintaining an
accustomed standard of living. Requiring life insurance of di-
vorcing parents would be a step toward this objective of the
Uniform Act,
None of the cases cited herein has considered whether,
under the Uniform Act, anyone other than a non-custodial fa-
ther may be required to maintain life insurance. May the re-
quirement be imposed on the custodial parent or on the
mother? Given the broad purpose of the new Kentucky law
-4 Riley v. Riley, 131 So.2d 491, 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (Sturgis, J., dissent-
ing).
" The best interest of the child is clearly the guiding principle in determining both
custody and support provisions. KRS §§ 403.210, .270 (Supp. 1978); UzNwom ACT,
Commissioners' Prefatory Note.
5For a discussion of the tax advantages that may be obtained in conjunction with
a life insurance provision, see Annot., supra note 5, and the sources cited therein.
Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Kitchens, 57 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Ct. App. 1967).
See, e.g., KRS § 403.210(3) (Supp. 1978).
See note 51 supra, for discussion on this point.
o Allison v. Allison, 363 P.2d 795 (Kan. 1961).
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which extends the support obligation beyond death-to afford
the child financial security upon the death of a parent-it
would seem that either or both parents could be required to
maintain life insurance,
In Kentucky, the father still shoulders the primary respon-
sibility for the financial support of the child.6 ' Under the com-
mon law, "primary" meant the mother bore no burden unless
the father died, disappeared, or was financially incapable and
the child was apt to need public assistance.62 But Kentucky law
is undergoing a subtle change. The support obligation is now
more likely to be seen as a mutual obligation. The adoption of
the Uniform Act was a step in that direction. Section 309 of the
Uniform Act provides that "the court may order either or both
parents owing a duty of support to a child . . .to pay an
amount reasonable . . .for his support."' 3 The comment to
section 309 disclaims any effort to prescribe a duty of support,"
but the criteria set forth to be used by the court in assessing
the dollar amount of support payments suggest a mutual obli-
gation. The section requires that the court look at the financial
resources of both parents, 5 whereas in the past the father's
obligation was assessed without considering the mother's re-
sources." Although Kentucky continues to impose by statute
" KRS § 405.020(1) (1970): "The father shall be primarily liable for the nurture
and education of his children who are under the age of eighteen (18)."
,2 Foster & Freed, Divorce Reform: Brakes on Breakdown?, 13 J. FAm. L. 443, 484
n.200 (1973-74).
'" UNIFORM Acr § 309; KRS § 403.210 (Supp. 1976).
" UNIFORM AcT, Commissioners' Note to § 309.
, KRS § 403.210 (Supp. 1978) provides:
Child support.-in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal sepa-
ration, maintenance, or child support, the court may order either or both
parents owing a duty of support to a child of the marriage to pay an amount
reasonable or necessary for his support, without regard to marital miscon-
duct, after considering all relevant factors including:
(1) The financial resources of the child;
(2) The financial resources of the custodial parent;
(3) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the
marriage not been dissolved;
(4) The physical and emotional condition of the child, and his
educational needs; and
(5) The financial resources and needs of the non-custodial parent.
(Italics indicate phrase added in Kentucky's adaptation of Uniform Act § 309).
" See, e.g., Barrickman v. Barrickman, 296 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1956); Beutel v.
Beutel, 189 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1945).
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the primary responsibility of support on the father,"7 KRS §
403.210 (Uniform Act § 309) has been interpreted as equalizing
the support obligation.s
When considering the child's best interest, a mutual obli-
gation simply makes sense. Such a mutual obligation does not
mean that each parent should be, or is, equally responsible in
the sense that each must contribute an equal dollar amount.
Support should be geared to the ability to pay.6" However, both
parents should be under the same duty. Given an equal duty,
yet taking into account the ability to pay, each spouse might
be required to maintain life insurance. 7 The fact that one par-
ent is custodian does not make that parent less responsible for
the child's support and certainly does not make the child less
dependent on that parent's support. If life insurance is to be
used to secure support for the child, it seems reasonable that
both parents, mother and father, custodian and non-custodian,
should be required to maintain life insurance for the child's
benefit.
By David A. Bratt
" See note 61 supra for Kentucky's statute.
" Brooks v. Burkeen, 549 S.W.2d 91 (Ky. 1977).
U Foster & Freed, supra note 62, at 484.
Foster and Freed suggest that even with an equal legal duty of support, "[a]s a
practical matter, . . . usually it will be the father who bears the major responsibility
in that regard because of the advantages our society accords the man in employment
and the discriminations it works against women." Id.
11 It is interesting to note that of single parent households, female heads of house-
holds are less apt to carry life insurance (72%) than are male heads of households
(96%). AmERicAN CouNcm OF LiFE INSURANCE, Lin INSURANCE FACT BOOK '77, at 34
(1977).
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